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1Introduction
Takatoshi Ito and Andrew K. Rose
The world currently faces dramatic short- term economic problems like the 
ongoing global fi nancial crises. But a number of long- term economic prob-
lems also exist. Of these, only one is both hugely important and reasonably 
predictable: the long- run demographic issue. Many advanced countries have 
followed a similar pattern of  change in their demographic composition, 
and are now reaching a fi nal stage of aging. A predictable crisis, due to the 
adverse eﬀects of the aging population, is looming in many advanced coun-
tries. The situation is perhaps most acutely in East Asia, where particularly 
rapid demographic change is occurring now.
Over the past decades, almost all industrial countries have experienced 
large decreases in the fertility rate. Their populations have simply become 
older and older. Since women are having fewer babies, and people are living 
longer, populations across the industrial world are aging; Japan is one the 
most extreme examples of high life expectancy and low fertility. Most rich 
countries now have fertility rates below the replacement rate of 2.1 children 
per woman; if  this eﬀect continues, their population will actually begin to 
shrink. This will not occur any time soon for most countries, but it is already 
happening in Japan and will soon be the case for Korea. This aging of the 
population has already had enormous economic and social consequences, 
and these consequences are likely only to rise in importance over time.
A number of economic consequences of an aging society have been inves-
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tigated by many authors.1 First, an aging population is expected to lower 
the (total and per- capita) growth rate, as the working population (in abso-
lute number and as the ratio of total population) declines. Thus an aging 
society is expected to be a drag on economic growth. The second feature 
stems from the fact that many countries use a Pay- As- You- Go (PAYGO) 
feature to fi nance their pension systems; that is, they use the current young’s 
premium payments for the current retired pension benefi ts. The pension 
system is thus an income transfer from working generations to retired gen-
erations, often using fi scal defi cits to mitigate the transfer problem. In many 
countries, the Pay- As- You- Go pension system is about to run into a problem 
as the baby boomers are about to retire and drastically change the support 
ratio. This is happening not only in Japan but also in Korea, Hong Kong, 
and in the near future, China (which has adopted a one- child policy). Third, 
as most health care costs are publicly provided in almost all countries, the 
aging population is expected to increase government spending on health 
considerably. As society ages, such expenditures have to be covered from 
a smaller tax base of  the working population, and the aged have higher 
health care expenditures. It is no surprise that many countries have shifted 
to fund government expenditures by indirect value- added- taxes rather than 
personal income tax, as population ages. Fourth, the ratio of savers and dis-
savers changes as the ratio of working to retired population changes. Thus 
a demographic change has impacts on saving and asset holding behavior of 
the aggregate household sector, thus aﬀecting asset prices (such as housing, 
stock, and bond prices), unless the supply side adjust to this change.
This volume consists of a selection of papers presented at the nineteenth 
annual East Asian Seminar on Economics (EASE- 19) on June 19– 21, 2008, 
in Seoul, Korea. The main theme of the conference was the economic con-
sequences of the demographic transition in East Asia, an area of the world 
currently experiencing a dramatic demographic transition.
The conference for this book took place in June 2008, a few months be-
fore the rapid global fi nancial meltdown which took place in the wake of 
the Lehman Brothers collapse. Many workers close to or in retirement lost 
a sizable portion of their savings as a result. For young workers, the 2008 
fi nancial shock may turn out to be a short- term (though deep) fi nancial 
cycle, and its consequences may be dominated by long demographic trends. 
The fi nancial shocks of 2008 and its consequences on saving and consump-
tion are not treated in the chapters in this volume.
1. For the last two decades, the NBER “Aging” group has been active in publishing vari-
ous lines of  work related to aging. See their website, http:/ / www.nber.org/ programs/ ag/ for 
a guide to a summary of activities as well as the past papers and books. The NBER group 
on Aging and Health has been issuing quarterly bulletin since 2002; see http:/ / www.nber.
org/ aginghealth/ 2009no1/ 2009no1.pdf. The most recent conference volume in the 20- year long 
series is Wise (2009). The NBER group also produced the two volumes on the U.S.– Japan 
comparison in aging. See Noguchi and Wise (1994) and Hurd and Yashiro (1997).
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In the rest of this introduction, we fi rst highlight several themes that run 
through several chapters in this volume, and weave those themes into several 
relevant questions. We then give summaries of the chapters, linking them 
to our themes.
Demographic Transition
It is easy to understand the demographic transition from a low- income 
developing state to a high- income advanced state. Health and family behav-
iors across countries and time have a number of common features in eco-
nomic development. There are four phases. Poor undeveloped states have 
fertility and mortality rates which are both high. There are many children 
per family, but people tend to die young, sometimes very young. During the 
second phase of development, the mortality rate begins to decline due to 
better nutrition and sanitary conditions, but the fertility rate remains high. 
As a consequence, the population grows, with a higher child dependency 
ratio as more children survive. As development continues, the country enters 
a third phase where the fertility begins to fall and eventually catches up to 
the falling mortality rate; this leads to a drop in the child and total (child 
plus elderly) dependency ratios. The drop in the dependency ratios implies 
an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, since the share of 
working- age people in the total population grows. In short, even if  the GDP 
per worker had remained the same, the GDP per capita (population) would 
increase in this state. Thus, the fi rst demographic dividend can be reaped. 
There is little controversy in the literature about the certainty of events and 
economic benefi ts about this dividend. However, longer life expectancy and 
lower fertility eventually causes population aging.
In the fourth and last phase, both the fertility and mortality rates become 
low. In this stage, the elderly and total dependency ratios rise due to the 
shrinking number of workers (resulting from the lower fertility rate) and the 
rising number of elderly (resulting from the lower mortality rate). The fi rst 
dividend disappears. There is a controversy, both theoretically and empiri-
cally, whether there is the second demographic dividend at the fi nal stage. 
The second demographic dividend occurs if  individuals do more lifecycle 
saving to prepare for a longer stretch of retirement, funded either by private 
savings or a fully funded pension scheme. If  much of the wealth remains at 
home (as opposed to fl owing out of the country), this accumulated wealth 
for retirement increases the capital/ labor ratio. The higher capital/ labor ra-
tio, due to accumulated life- cycle saving, promotes growth. However, the 
second dividend will not materialize if  the pension scheme is of the PAYGO 
type.
The East Asian countries are at various stages of the demographic transi-
tion. Japan is in the fi nal phase of demographic transition; Korea and China 
are in the third phase (the latter due in part to the one- child policy); and the 
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (except Singa-
pore) are in the second phase. This volume studies East Asian countries, and 
will attempt to give some insights concerning the demographic transition 
that the rest of the world may experience in the future. This book covers 
topics such as economic growth, economic security of the elderly, national 
saving and external assets, female labor participation, and expenditures of 
public education.
In this volume, most papers explain the economic consequences, such as 
economic growth, of demographic transition. They do not study the other 
direction of causality, how the fertility rate is aﬀected by economic growth. 
Therefore, an interesting question of  an interaction between economic 
growth and the fertility rate is not dealt with squarely. However, that topic 
is amply covered in the literature of demography.
Throughout the volume, an assumption is typically maintained that the 
retirement age is sixty- fi ve. In the pension systems of most advanced coun-
tries, a full pension requires delaying the start of benefi ts until the age of 
sixty- fi ve. An option of having pension benefi ts start at a younger age is an 
option, but the total benefi ts are then reduced. Of course, as the general 
health level and work aspirations of older people is rising in many countries 
including those in East Asia, a revision of the retirement age may be desir-
able for the sustainability of the pension system. However, this is beyond 
our scope in this volume.
Economic Growth
Although the demographic transition has many eﬀects, economic growth 
is among the most important of all implications. The fi rst three chapters of 
the volume examine prospects of economic growth among Asian countries 
based on demographic changes that have occurred and that are projected 
to occur.2
Mason, Lee, and Lee (chap. 1 in this volume) provide a fi ne overview of 
the common patterns of demographic transition in the major countries of 
East Asia. First, they show dramatic change in the support ratios between 
2008 and 2050: The population ratio of the old (age sixty- fi ve and older) 
increases in Japan from 17 percent to 38 percent, Hong Kong from 11 per-
cent to 33 percent, Korea from 7 percent to 35 percent, Singapore from 7 
percent to 33 percent, China from 7 percent to 24 percent, Thailand from 
7 percent to 23 percent, and Taiwan from 8 percent to 26 percent.
The authors are particularly concerned with the methods through which 
resources (not only income, but also healthcare) can be provided for the needs 
of the elderly. This question is relevant in predicting whether or not there is 
2. Kelley and Schmidt (2005) provide a comprehensive survey of  the literature on this 
topic.
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a second demographic dividend. They contrast PAYGO systems with fully 
funded systems. In PAYGO systems, no extra capital (in the form of reserves) 
is accumulated during the period of the fi rst demographic dividend, whether 
the transfers are provided by the state or through more informal family ar-
rangements. On the other hand, if  transfers are provided by fully funded 
savings from the workers themselves, there is extra capital accumulation. The 
latter (but not the former) can give rise to a second demographic dividend 
of economic growth. The authors show the inverse relationship between the 
fertility rate and educational and health expenditures (a proxy for human 
capital formation) per child in the region. Taiwan, Japan, and Korea are a 
group of countries with a very low fertility rate accompanied by very high 
health care and education expenditure in relation to average labor income of 
ages thirty through forty- nine. India, the Philippines, and Indonesia are just 
the opposite. Although the authors emphasize the relation between higher 
human capital investment and the fertility decline, they admit that the direc-
tion of causality direction is unclear. Japan and Taiwan are shown to rely 
more on public transfers and family transfers, thus eﬀects of raising capital 
is not clear. Through a simulation model for ASEAN countries, based on 
Mason and Lee (2007), the authors show that asset accumulation patterns 
would be very diﬀerent depending on the assumption on intergenerational 
transfers. In the case of low transfers (35 percent of old age consumption by 
transfers), the amount of assets would rise to seven times labor income in 
2050; while in the case of high transfers (65 percent of old age consumption 
by transfers), assets would rise to two times labor income in 2050. The model 
assumes that open capital markets, so that some assets may take the form 
of foreign assets, so it is not straightforward to make inference from assets 
accumulation to the domestic capital- labor ratio. The result is suggestive of 
the possibility of second demographic dividend.
Bloom, Canning, and Finlay (chap. 2 in this volume) also focus on the 
shifting age structure in Asia. The authors examine how much eﬀect the aging 
would aﬀect economic growth in the process of dissolving the fi rst demo-
graphic dividend. The authors employ reduced- form regressions, explaining 
per capita growth by demographic factors, in addition to a standard set from 
the convergence growth model, such as the real GDP per capital at the initial 
year. The demographic factors include young- age share (in population) and 
old- age share at the initial year of regression, the fi ve- year changes in the 
young- age share and old- age share. The long run eﬀect of  demographic 
composition is estimated from the coeﬃcients of the young- age share and 
old- age share at the initial year. The old- age share turns out to be insig-
nifi cant in aﬀecting the per capita growth, while the young- age share at 
the initial year turns out to aﬀect growth negatively. The magnitude of the 
long- run eﬀect is estimated as follows: a 10 percentage point decrease in the 
youth- age share will increase the economic growth per capita by 2.2 per-
centage points, leading to a higher steady state income per capita in the long 
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run. The short- run eﬀects of  the changes in the young- age and old- age 
shares are estimated from coeﬃcients of fi ve year changes in those shares: a 
one percentage point decrease in the youth- age share over a fi ve year period 
increases per capita economic growth by 0.7 percentage points. A 1.0 per-
centage point increase in the old age share over a fi ve year period decreases 
per capital economic growth by 1.5 percentage points. The positive impact 
of a decline in youth age share and the neutrality of the old age share on eco-
nomic growth per capita are consistent with Kelley and Schmidt (2005).
The authors infer that the diﬀerence between the short and long run eﬀects 
of the old- age share comes from various behavioral responses of people to 
demographic change. The authors emphasize an increase in female labor 
participation rate, the quantity- quality trade- oﬀ for children, a change in 
saving behavior and a change in social security (such as postponement of 
retirement age), with literature survey of these behavioral responses. These 
behavioral responses to aging may partially, if  not totally, mitigate the ad-
verse eﬀect of aging on growth. The authors conclude that that population 
aging may not signifi cantly impede economic performance in Asia in the 
long run.
Mason, Lee, and Lee (chap. 1 in this volume) and Bloom, Canning, and 
Finlay (chap. 2 in this volume) are complementary in that they provide two 
diﬀerent sets of explanations concerning why Asian growth may not slow 
down due to the disappearing fi rst demographic dividend—certainly not 
as much as a naïve model would predict. The former emphasize a possible 
second dividend (higher capital labor ratio due to higher life- cycle saving), 
while the latter emphasize behavioral change of people in response to chang-
ing fertility and life expectancy.
Hahn and Park (chap. 3 in this volume) investigate the relationships 
between: (a) the speed of demographic transition and per capita income 
growth, and (b) the speed of demographic transition and human capital 
accumulation. They employ both cross- country regression and micro- level 
household survey data of Korea. Although the authors motivate the study 
by invoking an endogenous growth model with endogenous fertility, an 
empirical part of the study is not explicitly derived from the theory, as the 
authors admit. The contribution of this chapter thus lies in its empirical 
undertaking.
In this cross- country (141 countries) study, Hahn and Park specify a 
growth regression, which is essentially common with that of the two pre-
ceding chapters; it includes a speed of demographic transition. Three sets 
of regressions are examined, each having standard variables of convergence 
growth model along with one of the three demographic variables: (a) the 
change in fertility rate (an average yearly change); (b) the change in the 
working- age population ratio; and (c) the change in population growth 
rate. They fi nd that an increase in the speed of fertility decline increases the 
growth rate of per capita income; a faster increase in working- age popu-
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lation ratio also increases the growth rate of  per capital income. Finally, 
a higher population growth rate increases the growth rate of  per capita 
income. Although the authors do not directly examine it, the regression is 
quite close to testing the degree of fi rst dividend, which is directly specifi ed 
in Bloom, Canning, and Finlay (chap. 2 in this volume).
Next, Hahn and Park examine the relationship between the speed of 
demographic transition of a country and the speed of its human capital 
accumulation. They fi nd that countries with faster changes in working- age 
population ratio or faster decline in population growth rate, also experience 
a faster increase in years of schooling at all levels.
In the second half  of the chapter, Hahn and Park examine a diﬀerent data 
set. The household level survey in Korea is used to test the quality- quantity 
trade- oﬀ. Educating a child requires considerable resources in terms of both 
time and money. Indeed, a standard explanation for the decline in fertility is 
the trade- oﬀ between child quality and the quantity of children; this states 
that richer parents tend to prefer fewer “high quality” children in whom 
they invest their resources rather than more but “lower quality” children. 
This commonly heard hypothesis is rarely tested directly. Hahn and Park 
make use of a Korean micro data to investigate investment in human capital 
and take the quality- quantity trade- oﬀ seriously. It is found that with many 
reasonable control variables, the per- child expenditure on education is nega-
tively infl uenced by the number of children. Reassuringly, their empirics are 
quite consistent with the quality- quantity trade- oﬀ, a rare but important 
feat in this mostly theoretical area of work.
Japan
Japan is a large open economy that stands out as the most rapidly aging 
country in the world. It has the longest life expectancy as well as one of the 
lowest fertility rates. This means that Japan’s soon- to- retire baby boomers 
will enter the fi nal phase of the demographic transition (with a shrinking 
population), something that has not been experienced by any other society. 
The Japanese population peaked in 2004, and Japan is now in the phase 
of declining population. By 2080, the population is estimated to be half  its 
current size. In 2004, the Japanese total fertility rate was 1.26, one of the low-
est in the world. The aging of Japanese society is very rapid; the proportion 
of the elderly (sixty- fi ve years and above) will rise from 20.2 percent in 2005 
to 30 percent by 2023, rising further to more than 40 percent by 2052.
Accordingly, three chapters in this volume focus on Japan. Ogawa, Mason, 
Chawla, and Matsukura (chap. 4 in this volume) describe the past, present, 
and future of the demographic transition, using many indicators. Takayama 
(chap. 5 in this volume) focuses on the Japanese social security system that is 
mostly a PAYGO system. The rapid aging is expected to cause great stress on 
the PAYGO pension system. Ohtake and Sano (chap. 6 in this volume) will 
examine the political economy of education support for the young.
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Ogawa, Mason, Chawla, and Matsukura provide an overview of Japan’s 
truly unprecedented demographic transition. Compared with other coun-
tries, Japan experienced a very short baby boom; the fertility rate rapidly rose 
and then dramatically fell after World War II. A large number of Japanese 
women have become, and are projected to remain, unmarried and child-
less. Some of this low fertility may be involuntary, since the ideal number 
of children (as expressed by mature Japanese) remains higher than the ac-
tual fertility rate. Nevertheless, the decrease in fertility is only part of the 
larger picture. Even more important is the fact that the expected Japanese 
lifespan has increased quickly. Mortality is becoming an increasingly im-
portant demographic feature, and Japan correspondingly has a low frac-
tion of  lifetime devoted to work. Few of the elderly are now living with 
married children, and expect to depend on care provided by children. The 
authors provide a fascinating and compelling portrait of these stylized facts 
with a terrifi c visual display of quantitative information. They show that 
Japan benefi ted from the fi rst dividend in the 1950s and 1960s, reaching 1 per-
centage point of economic growth rate at the peak. However, the fi rst divi-
dend turned negative in the 2000s, and is projected to remain negative for a 
long time. The second dividend was large in the 1980s, reaching 1.5 percent 
at the peak, but this has gradually declined to less than 0.5 percent in the 
2000s. Since the current retired and the soon- to- retire baby boomers have 
accumulated large private wealth, how these elderly utilize or spend their 
wealth has impacts on the future course of the economy.
The authors examine the mix of public and private transfers as well as 
private wealth reallocation in life cycle. A number of interesting fi ndings 
are highlighted. They fi nd that the impact of the rapid growth of the elderly 
population on transfers has been remarkable. Transfers to the old (sixty-
 fi ve years and older) increased three- fold between 1984 and 2004, in which 
public transfers increased 4.4 times, while the amount of net familial trans-
fers declined by 75 percent. Conversely, net public transfers are negative 
for the working population (ages twenty to fi fty- nine). In 2004, the peak of 
negative transfers occurred approximately at age fi fty- seven. The authors 
fi nd that the Japanese relatively young elderly (in their sixties and seven-
ties) provided more assistance to adult children and / or grandchildren than 
fi nancial transfers they receive. This is quite an interesting fi nding.
The authors suggest that the second dividend is still a possibility, given 
that large private wealth has been accumulated, and conclude, “the Japa-
nese elderly represent a powerful asset to keep the country on a sound and 
steady growth path in the years to come. Furthermore, over the past decade 
or so, they have been informally playing the role of the society’s safety net 
by providing fi nancial assistance to their adult children and grandchildren 
suﬀering from fi nancial diﬃculties.”
Takayama provides a comprehensive survey of  the past, present, and 
future of the Japanese pension system. He describes the original pension 
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system, the 2004 reforms, and related problems such as the incentives prob-
lem stemming from high rates of social security contribution (higher than 
taxes), and worsening demographic support ratio. He uses the “balance 
sheet” approach to analyzing pensions throughout, and focuses on inter- 
and intragenerational equity. The Japanese system is quite generous; many 
of the elderly are better oﬀ than most workers. There have been many im-
plementation problems associated with Japanese pensions, especially and 
most visibly in recent years (most infamously when fi fty million social secu-
rity fi les were discovered to be unmatched to people). However, these short-
 term problems pale in comparison to the more serious long- term problems. 
There are two such problems. First, as a PAYGO system, Japan has to pay 
benefi ts to retirees that have been promised in the past. This phenomenon 
is known as the “legacy debt” problem. More importantly, the Japanese 
population is shrinking and projected to decline for the foreseeable future; 
creating a sustainable system for the future is a second and separate prob-
lem, apart from that of legacy debt. As the demographic transition makes it 
harder and harder to keep benefi t level (replacement ratio) from falling and 
keep contribution rate from rising, the current younger generation neces-
sarily is worse oﬀ than the current retired in their life- time net benefi t from 
the pension system.3
In 2004, the Japanese system was changed so as to become more sustain-
able, since it was, and remains, currently underfunded (unless the economy 
suddenly begins to grow at a much higher rate than a rate commonly believed 
to be possible). The 2004 reform includes: a new system of indexation that 
depends on wage growth rate; increased but also capped contributions; a 
reduced replacement rate; and increased government subsidies to the basic 
pension scheme from the general budget. Takayama shows that this reform 
makes the system substantially less desirable for the young generation. The 
higher contribution rates hurt the young to the benefi t of the elderly. The 
present value of future benefi ts is only around 80 percent of contributions, 
which seems unfair to younger generations to come. Takayama reviews fi ve 
policy options that have been proposed in Japan: privatizing the second- tier 
proportional- to- earning portion; move to a fully funded pension; switch to 
universal pension; move to notional defi ned contribution; and introducing 
minimum guaranteed pension. Either proposal has benefi ts and shortcom-
ings. We are left with a depressing picture indeed, though of an important 
critical assessment of an important Japanese public policy.
Ohtake and Sano (chap. 6 in this volume) poses an interesting political 
economy question on the relationship between aging and public education 
support. Do the elderly support government expenditure on education? If  
3. For those who think the issue in a broader intergenerational transfers, a generational 
accounting may be a better way of examining the issue. See Takayama, Kitamura, and Yoshida 
(1999).
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the elderly are median voters, one would theoretically expect the elderly 
not to support education, since they receive no direct benefi ts from public 
education. Indeed, transfers to the elderly may come at the expense of educa-
tion, given that they compete in the municipal government budgets.
However, the elderly may be supportive of public education, if  they are 
altruistic vis- à- vis the younger generation. Alternatively, the elderly may be 
self- interested, if  the extra human capital provided by education provides 
an indirect benefi t to the elderly. The literature has a large number of mixed 
empirical results linking the importance of the elderly and their support for 
public spending. But there has been relatively little empirical analysis cover-
ing Japan, and this chapter fi lls the gap.
Ohtake and Sano use a panel data set covering Japan’s 47 prefectures 
between 1975 and 2005. The authors use panel data analysis with fi xed eﬀect; 
divide the sample into two periods: between 1975 and 1985, and from 1990 
to 2009. They fi nd that a higher share of the elderly increased the expen-
diture on compulsory education per student by local governments in the 
1970s– 1980s. However, the reverse became true in the 1990s– 2000s. Then 
Ohtake and Sano also ask why there was a change in attitudes of the elderly 
towards educational spending after 1990. They examine four possible rea-
sons. First, it is possible that the elderly suddenly became selfi sh rather than 
altruistic around 1990 (though this is hardly an explanation). Second, the 
young became uninterested in politics and thus increasingly absent from the 
voting booth. Simultaneously the elderly continue to faithfully participate 
in elections. Combined with demographic gravity (which is tilting toward 
the elderly), the elderly have thus seized political power and now control the 
local governments, which duly implement policies that are benefi cial to the 
elderly. A third hypothesis is that the change in the household structure has 
caused the decline in support of public education. The ratio of the elderly 
living alone (as opposed to living with children and grandchildren), has 
increased and this might gradually reduce the altruism of the elderly. Fourth, 
the change in the sign of coeﬃcient may have been caused by the change in 
the public fi nance system of local governments.
There were fewer three- generation families by the end of  the sample, 
but the authors show that this explanation does not explain the patterns 
observed. The same negative result is obtained in a specifi cation that in-
cludes diﬀerent living arrangements of  the elderly in the regression. The 
authors then speculate that the change arose from the switch in the public 
subsidy system, where discretionary power and burden of the local govern-
ment in public education spending has increased since 1985. For example, 
the subsidy from the national government for the salary of public school 
teachers has been gradually reduced.
Ohtake and Sano provide evidence suggestive of generational confl ict in 
terms of support for public education. As admitted by the authors, going 
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to municipal data rather than prefectural data would sharpen the results, as 
most public education decisions are done at the municipal level.
Korea
Two chapters examine issues in Korea. Publicly- provided pensions are 
a relatively new phenomenon in Korea, where intergenerational transfers 
within family have been the norm historically. What is the relationship 
between these diﬀerent types of transfers? Do public transfers crowd out 
those from family members? Kim (chap. 7 in this volume) pursues this fas-
cinating issue empirically with the four data sets: Korean Labor and Income 
Panel Study, the Korean Longitudinal Study of Ageing, and the Korean 
Retirement and Income Study. Moreover, Kim compares the result with a 
comparable data set from the United States.
First, Kim describes notable features from the three Korean data sets. For 
example, he fi nds that Koreans have given to their parents much more than 
comparable Americans. About 62 percent of Korean households give some 
transfers to their parents or parents- in- law; in contrast, only 16.5 percent 
of American households make transfers to their parents or parents- in- law. 
Recall Ogawa et al.; while Japanese (relatively young) elderly give trans-
fers to their adult children, the Korean elderly are on the receiving end of 
transfers.
Second, Kim shows that some of the transfers are motivated by altruism, 
since an increase in public support negatively aﬀects private transfers. In 
1980, three- quarters of elderly income took the form of transfers; in 2003, 
the ratio had fallen to just quarter. This has happened in part because of 
public policy; Kim fi nds evidence that expectations of public pensions have 
crowded out private transfers. Transfers are also motivated by exchange 
motive, as more care for grandchildren is rewarded by more transfers to the 
elderly by their adult children.
Third, the eldest takes on the heavy burden of supporting the parents. 
In return, Koreans also diﬀer from Americans since they give concentrated 
bequests, often to their eldest son (in America, by way of contrast, bequests 
tend to be spread evenly). Fourth, investing in an additional year of educa-
tion into child tends to result in higher transfers to the parent (when they 
become old), by an equivalent of ninety U.S. dollars. Kim concludes that 
investment in child’s education is not worthwhile as an investment vehicle 
for retirement, at least measured in purely pecuniary terms.
Kim concludes that the current trend towards deteriorating familial sup-
port mechanisms in Korea is thereby shifting burdens to the public sector 
and the elderly themselves. Perhaps though future generations may become 
more self- reliant and accumulate wealth, possibly giving rise to a second 
demographic dividend.
Lee (chap. 8 in this volume) investigates the labor force participation 
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(LFP) of older males (sixty and above) in Korea over the past fi fty years, 
taking advantage of  the availability of  a long span of  data through the 
Population and Housing Census. The author is interested in understanding 
the increase in LFP for Korean men from the 1960s to the mid- 1990s, while 
in other OECD countries, the LFP tends to have declined. Lee shows that 
there was a substantial decline in LFP from 1997 to 2000, most likely due to 
the East Asian fi nancial crisis. He shows that the increase in LFP from 1965 
to 1995 is largely due to an increase in LFP in rural areas, from 46 percent 
in 1965 to 70 percent in 1995. Population aging in rural areas is produced 
by the mass- migration of younger people to urban areas, which contributed 
to an increase in LFP among older males. The average size of farm house-
holds decreased from 6.4 persons in 1963 to 2.8 persons in 2006.
Lee uses an econometric model of LFP using data that are pooled over 
time, and links it to education, marital status, family size, and various re-
gional characteristics. Age, as expected, is negatively correlated with labor 
participation. Among city dwellers, college graduates tend to stay in the 
labor market, but among rural dwellers, all levels of education have a nega-
tive impact on labor market participation. Married men were much more 
likely to be in the labor force than single men. The family size is negatively 
correlated with the labor market participation. Older men in rural areas were 
much more likely to be active in the labor force than their counterparts in 
the city. Being a farmer has strong impact on the labor participation rate, 
and the coeﬃcient is much higher in rural areas than in city. From these, 
Lee concludes that losing family labor in rural households owning to rural-
 urban migrations was a major cause of the rise in the LFP of older males 
between 1980 and 1997.
The author pursues empirical analysis using a relatively untouched micro 
data set concerning housing and population. Unfortunately, the data set has 
a number of disadvantages, including an absence of income data. Thus, all 
the data set allows one to observe is whether a given participant is working 
(or working occasionally). Reassuringly, those data line up well with those 
from other surveys. With help of diﬀerent sources, Lee observes that the 
ratio of the income of farm households to the income of urban households 
shows a long- term declining trend, except for the late 1960s. People living in 
rural areas are much less prepared fi nancially for old- age security than city 
dwellers. The average amount of net savings of rural households was only 
76 percent of the net wealth held by urban households.
Lee concludes that older males in rural areas tend to stay in the labor force 
longer involuntarily because of insuﬃcient savings. Lee hypothesizes that 
this results from the shrinking size of the families located on farms (as the 
young leave the farms for the cities); rural income and wealth are both low, 
and farmers may fi nd it diﬃcult to save for retirement.
The Kim and Lee chapters are complementary in understanding the 
status and behavior of the elderly in Korea: Kim focuses on intergenera-
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tional (monetary and in- kind) transfers without distinguishing rural and 
city dwellers; Lee focuses on the diﬀerence in labor market participation 
among the rural and city dwellers based on micro survey, but without income 
information. Ideally, comprehensive micro information on income, labor 
participation, and asset holding, with rural- city distinction, would be desir-
able in such an analysis.
China
While the demographic transition probably has its most visible eﬀects 
on growth and transfers to the elderly, it also has a large number of other 
eﬀects. The consequences for health and fertility decision are among the 
most important.
Almond, Edmund, and Lee (chap. 9 in this volume) ask the important 
question “What are the long- term eﬀects of maternal malnutrition?” His-
tory matters if  there are important eﬀects, since even short- term depriva-
tion during pregnancy can aﬀect up to two subsequent generations.4 But are 
health and labor productivity really be aﬀected by conditions in the distant 
past? This chapter provides persuasive evidence that the answer is clearly 
positive. The authors use the awful Chinese famine of 1959– 1961 associated 
with the “Great Leap Forward.” This famine is a natural experiment which 
seems independent of education, labor market, and other such phenomena 
that might otherwise be confounding issues (i.e., it is plausibly exogenous). 
The authors examine people born during this period of time examined us-
ing data from the 2000 census, for example, some forty years later. Because 
weaker people are more likely to die in a famine, any estimated eﬀects are 
likely to be conservative (because of selection bias). The authors fi nd that 
those in gestation during the famine were disproportionately on leave from 
work in 2000, were supported disproportionately by other household mem-
bers, and have smaller houses. They also have less human capital, are less 
likely to be married, are more disabled, are more likely to be female, and 
are less likely to work. Further, there is also an “echo eﬀect” for subsequent 
generations. These strong and persuasive negative consequences are basi-
cally the same, independent of whether one relies on time- series or cross- 
sectional variation in the data set. Also, comparable features are not appar-
ent in those born in Hong Kong during the same period of time. While this 
is a clever use of a natural but narrow experiment, it has potentially broad 
implications, since there continues to be tremendous inequality in nutrition 
access in developing countries.
As discussed in the Mason, Lee, and Lee (chap. 1 in this volume) and 
Bloom, Canning, and Finlay (chap. 2 in this volume), one possible response of 
low fertility is higher educational investment into child(ren)—the quantity-
4. Females are born with their eggs, so malnutrition during pregnancy can aﬀect grand-
children as well as children.
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 quality trade- oﬀ. However, if  a woman has no children, the trade- oﬀ cannot 
be taken advantage of. Indeed, low fertility means that many women will 
never have children, while others have multiple children. With no children, 
human capital investment disappears. This poses an important problem to 
models of endogenous economic growth as well as to society; the possibility 
of childless woman is often neglected in the literature.
In the literature, many studies have examined the determinants of  the 
fertility rate, and it is well known that the fertility rate is negatively cor-
related with woman’s educational attainment and income level. It is true 
that that a higher proportion of women in East Asia have recently gained 
higher education and mainstream jobs, but the speed of the decline in fertil-
ity rate in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is remarkable. Lui (chap. 
10 in this volume) tackles this problem along three innovative lines. First, 
the variable to be explained is the desired number of children rather than 
the actual number of children at the time of data collection, since women 
bear children in diﬀerent ages. The author takes advantage of a survey that 
asks women for their desired number of children (the sum of existing chil-
dren and “the number of additional children the respondent plans to have”) 
as well as other information that aﬀects the decision. Second, the childless 
phenomenon is seriously examined. An ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion to explain the fertility rate might produce a fi tted value of negative chil-
dren (at least for some combination of right- hand- side variables). In order 
to fi x this problem, Lui uses alternative techniques: Tobit, the generalized 
Poisson regression, and a binary dummy variable approach. Third, Lui uti-
lizes interesting questions on the survey of controls to sharpen the results.
Lui (chap. 10 in this volume) shows that the status of  being married, 
having siblings, and living in a larger house all have positive impacts on the 
number of desired children. Further, schooling, age, experience (number 
of years) of work, and commuting time all have negative impacts on the 
number of desired children. Both the squared schooling and the squared 
experience of work have positive coeﬃcient, so that the negative eﬀect of 
very high education attainment is mitigated. Interestingly, income is sta-
tistically insignifi cant in Tobit and Probit regressions, and has a positive 
coeﬃcient in the generalized Poisson regression. The dummy variables that 
are unique from the survey also give interesting insights. Factors lowering 
desired fertility include (a) a perceived negative impact on job and career; 
(b) lack of confi dence in the education system; (c) ignorance concerning 
how to raise children; (d) distaste for children; and (e) a lack of confi dence 
in the existing marriage. Although the number of respondents who evinced 
the distaste for children (d) is small, 4.5 percent, it has the largest magnitude 
of coeﬃcient. There are also positive factors for desired fertility, including 
(f) a taste for children; (g) a perceived social responsibility to have children; 
and (h) a desire to have children in order to secure old- age support. Putting 
the results all together, Lui contributes to the literature of fertility decisions 
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in an innovative way. This type of work is very much needed in other East 
Asian countries with very low fertility rates.
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